# Cloakapps > Cloakapps lets developers give AI agents scoped operations over sensitive files and > cryptographic keys without handing the agent a permanent private key. Humans provision > trust and authorize policy; agents operate within scope; signed receipts record supported > operations. ## Start here - Developer guide: https://www.cloakapps.com/agentic.html - Quickstart: https://www.cloakapps.com/agentic.html#quick-start - Human/agent control model: https://www.cloakapps.com/agents.html - KMS product and custody paths: https://www.cloakapps.com/kms.html - Protected-file workflow: https://www.cloakapps.com/cloak.html - Receipt verification: https://www.cloakapps.com/verify.html - Pricing: https://www.cloakapps.com/pricing.html - FAQ: https://www.cloakapps.com/faq.html - Comparison: https://www.cloakapps.com/compare.html ## Product hierarchy 1. Cloak File is the first protected-file workflow. 2. Cloak KMS provides scoped credentials, key operations, human approval boundaries, receipts, and custody paths. 3. Customer-controlled keys connect a supported HSM through Cloak Gateway. 4. Cloak Vault and Batchsign are additional capabilities for qualified workflows. ## Custody lanes - Software-key sandbox: evaluation only; no hardware-custody claim. - Managed hardware: availability, limits, and assurance depend on the subscribed plan and configured device. - Customer-controlled hardware: the customer owns the supported HSM and connects it through Cloak Gateway. - Agents do not provision the root of trust or receive private-key material from a key operation. ## MCP - Discovery endpoint: https://kms.cloakapps.com/kms/mcp/info - MCP endpoint: https://kms.cloakapps.com/kms/mcp - Transport: JSON-RPC 2.0 over streamable HTTP - Authentication: user JWT or a scope-bound agent credential created under a human account Currently documented KMS tools: - kms_list_masterkeys - kms_read_public_key - kms_create_masterkey - kms_delete_masterkey - kms_sign - kms_verify - kms_encrypt - kms_decrypt - kms_ecdh_derive Check the live discovery endpoint for the current tool list, protocol version, required scopes, and examples. Hardware backing depends on the credential's configured custody lane; do not infer hardware custody from the tool name alone. ## Receipts - Verifier: https://www.cloakapps.com/verify.html - Schema: https://verify.cloakapps.com/schemas/receipt-v1.json - Receipt-signing JWKS: https://verify.cloakapps.com/.well-known/cloakapps-receipt-keys.json A valid signature proves that the named issuer signed the receipt payload and that the payload has not changed since signing. It does not independently prove that every real-world claim inside the payload is true. Interpret the receipt together with the issuer, operation semantics, trust boundary, and custody configuration. ## Governance and legal - Human-accountability charter: https://www.cloakapps.com/charter.html - Privacy: https://www.cloakapps.com/privacy.html - Terms: https://www.cloakapps.com/terms.html - Acceptable use: https://www.cloakapps.com/policy.html - Security contact: https://www.cloakapps.com/.well-known/security.txt